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Friends of Cornell University express the fear that because in
the article in our last number on "Systems in Legal Education"
credit was given to Cornell for inventing the term "coacentric
system," a false impression may be created that the Cornell Col-
lege of Law used that system. To correct any misapprehension
on that score it should be stated that the Cornell School of Law
has at least a penchant for the case system. We quote from a
letter from Dean Frank Irvine on the subject:
"Pray do not consider us as 'wedded' to the case system, at
least in the sense of pursuing the system exclusively or even as a
cult. No system is imposed on the school. Every piofessor is
free to pursue his own method. Every professor now here does
use the case system, but in the first year work text books are
used in connection with cases and I do not think that any member
of this faculty believes that in its extreme form the case system
is sufficient in itself."
CONTEMPT OF COURT
That the American Courts of today have an ever-increasing
amount of litigation before them and that they should not be
unduly hindered by counsel; also that they will not allow careless
practitioners to offend their dignity by making unnecessary delays
in court proceedings, is the decided stand taken by the St. Louis
Court of Appeals of Missouri in I re Clark, 103 S. W. Rep. xio5.
The decision seems to be one more of the signs of the times and
emphasizes the fact that delays are dangerous, in law as well as
in the outside world.
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The case of State v. Wilkins, W. H. Clark, attorney for the
defendant, was assigned for trial May 6th, 1907, in one of the
Circuit Courts of the city of St. Louis. Mr. Clark appeared and
explained that the defense was not ready for trial so that the
case was postponed until 2 o'clock of the same day. He then
appeared and presented an application for a continuance, which
was overruled by the court but he was allowed until May 9 th, at
zo a. m. in which to secure the presence of witnesses. He failed
to appear at the hour named, but sent word that he was engaged
in trying a case in another court, whereupon the court notified
him that the case would again be called at 5 o'clock of the same
day. At that time the attorney appeared and at his request the
case was set for trial at 9 a. m. of the next day, May ioth.
The court was duly convened at 9 a. m. on the day set, but
Mr. Clark failed to appear until 9:15 when he was promptly
adjudged guilty of contempt and fined $io, the record showing
that the delay was intentional. Several jurors were then examined
and Mr. Clark at 10:4o asked permission to leave the court for
ten minutes to attend to another case in which he was counsel, in
the Court of Criminal Correction. The judge assented but Mr.
Clark was away nearly an hour and on his return was fined $20.
for contempt, in absenting himself for a time longer than the
court had granted.
That a court of record has the power and authority to punish
for contempt is a well established doctrine, taken from the English
Common Law, and the inherent right to relieve in a summary
way against the misconduct of an attorney was recognized in i8o5
in New York. People v. Smith, 3 Caine, N. Y. 221. The reports
contain many cases of contempt but none of them seem to have
been for a mere delay in attending a session of the court although
it is good law that if a contempt is committed in the presence of
the court, the court has immediate jurisdiction of the person of
the offender and he may be instantly apprehended at the court's
discretion. Afiddlebrook v. The Slate, 43 Conn. 257. We can not
adversely criticise the summary act of the judge in committing
for contempt, for it has been stated that a criminal contempt con-
sists in any act in disrespect of the court or its powers which
obstructs the administration of justice or tends to bring the court
into disrepute, Wages v. Commonwealth, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 925, and
this case was of an aggravated nature and the delay extremely
discourteous to the court.
The court expresses itself very clearly when it says, "An
attorney at law is an officer of the court and it is as much incum-
bent on him to attend the sitting of the court when a case in
which he is of counsel, is on trial, and which trial cannot proceed
in his absence, as it is for the sheriff or the clerk of the court to
be present. The absence of an attorney in certain circumstances
unavoidably causes delay in the administration of justice which
is a criminal contempt; if not a contempt, then the administration
in the courts of the State would be at the mercy of the attorneys
and they, instead of being aids to the court might become an
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insufferable obstruction to its administration of justice by merely
remaining away from court when it was their duty to be in
attendance."
The power of committing for contempt lies solely in the dis-
cretion of the judge and either tardiness on the part of counsel
has been of rare occurence, which we are not inclined to believe,
or this judge has been among the first to endeavor to enforce
punctuality.
Attorney Clark failed to pay the fines and was committed to
jail whereupon he sued out a writ of habeas corpus alleging that
he was denied a hearing. The Court of Appeals in commenting
upon this said that the judgment record showed that "the court
was of opinion that the delay on the part of said Clark was inten-
tional" from which it reasoned that the court could not have
formed this opinion without some evidence of the fact and as the
habeas corpus proceeding was a collateral attact on the judgment,
every reasonable attendment must be indulged in support of the
judgment. In other words, the court on habeas corpus proceed-
ings refused to investigate anything except what appeared on the
face of the record, previously assuming that the court which had
made the commitment had had jurisdiction.
This view has been long held in England and is clearly
expressed by Blackstone J. in Lord Mayor's case, 3 Wilson 188,
204: "The sole adjudication of contempt and the punishment
thereof in any manner, belongs exclusively and without interfer-
ence to each respective court. Infinite confusion would follow if
courts could, by writs of habeas corpus, examine and determine
the contempts of others, for if they have power to decide, they
ought to have power to punish." Contempt of Court, 20 Am.
Law Reg. 292. So it is said to be the general practice not to
inquire into the judgment of another court for contempt, Shattuck
v. State, 5' Miss. 50, and the Supreme Court of the United States
has adopted the rule that each Superior Court, being the judge of
its own power to punish contemnors, no other court can question
the existence of that power and the facts constituting the con-
tempt need not be set out in the record. U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch
32 ;,exparte Kearney 7 Wheat. 38. This rule has, however, been
modified in many of the states both by statutes and decisions, but
the prevailing American view is that on a habeas corpus in case
of a commitment for contempt, the court can examine only two
questions: first, as to jurisdiction; second, as to the form of com-
mitment. When the jurisdiction is undoubted and the commitment
is sufficient in form and contains all that the statute requires, the
prisoner must be remanded and the writ discharged. Rapalje on
Contempt, p. 227.
We fully believe that all attorneys should assist the court by
prompt attendance and admire the decision of the St. Louis court,
especially since it appears that the judge who made the commit-
ment is dependent upon the people for election to his office. We
might have expected such a ruling from one who had been
appointed for life. The delay occasioned by a delinquent attor-
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ney not only effects him but the court together with all its officers,
as well as the opposing counsel, and we feel that the judgment
of contempt in this case was deserved and fitting and that it
should have its effect on court procedure.
SUPPORT OF CHILDREN IN ABSENCE OF PROVISION THEREFOR
IN DECREE AWARDING CUSTODY TO DIVORCED WIFE.
The question as to the liability of the father for the support
of the children in the absence of a provision therefor in the decree
which awards their custody to the divorced wife, has given rise
to one of the sharpest conflicts of authority known to the realm
of law. The opposing decisions being almost equal in number and
dignity, the opinions being based upon arguments equally strong
and convincing, it would, indeed, be presumptious to say that one
or the other constitutes the weight of authority. The most that
can be said is that the oldest doctrine holds that the huisband is
not liable in such cases and that the trend of the decisions is
towards the later doctrine which holds to the contrary. The
former view still obtains in the following states: Connecticut,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, New
York, and Rhode Island; the latter in Arkansas, California,
Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin and by the recent decision, in
Maryland.
In the recent case of Avey v. -Hartwig, 67 Atl. (Md.) 132, the
plaintiff had obtained a divorce from her husband, in which pro-
ceeding the custody of two infant children had been awarded to her
but no provision made for their maintenance. She, having sup-
ported the children since the decree, brings this action against her
husband to recover the expense therefor. It was held that she
could recover. The court reaches this conclusion from the fact that
the father is primarily liable for the support of his infant children
and cannot relieve himself of this obligation by his own wrong.
The two views differ: first, in their conceptions of the common
law in regard as to whose duty it is to support the minor children;
second, as to who is entitled to the services of the infant children
after divorce; third, as to the effect of father's wrong upon his
rights in the premises; and fourth, as to the conclusiveness of the
decree upon subsequent proceedings.
The first and oldest view is based upon the following facts.
The obligation to support, protect and educate the children is a
nataral obligation and at common law was the duty of both parents
and rested equally upon them. It is made a statutory duty in
those states enacting that "The father and mother, grandfather
and grandmother, of poor, impotent persons, shall maintain them
if of sufficient ability, as the quarter sessions shall direct." While
the relation of husband and wife continues, the husband is the
head of the family and it is his duty to support and educate the
children, so far as third persons are concerned. But as between
the husband and wife and the children, the duty is equally that of
28.
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the mother and father. As bead of the family, he is bound to
support and educate his children and is entitled to their care,
control, services and society. The right and the duty are reciprocal.
The effect of the divorce is to render the husband and wiie
single persons. They are strangers. The husband is no longer
head of the family, for the family relation has been dissolved. He
is head of whatever part of the family remains with him, and she
of whatever remains with her. If the childreh are awarded to her
by the decree, she obtains the right to their control, services and
society. So it is but just that she assume the obligation of their
support and education. If the husband must support them, he
should be permitted to have them in his own home so as to be
better able to judge of their needs and support them in his own
way Besides he should be given the aid of their society and
services.
In proceeding for divorce, all matters pertaining to the family
relation are before the court for its disposal. All rights and
duties are settled and determined by the court having before it
all the circumstances and the respective situations of the parties.
,u. court : A , U±u t is UUL uuunu to maze an allowance to the-wife for the
support of the children, the custody of whom has been awarded
to her. The decree is rendered, having in mind all the rights
and cduties of the parties. By accepting the provisions of the decree
she is presumed to have accepted, and the court is presumed to
have given her all she was entitled to. That this is true is evi-
denced by the well-known fact that courts generally lean toward
mothers as far as possible in cases of this kind. This is as right
as it is natural. Failure to ask for an allowance is equivalent to
an admission by the wife that an allowance was not necessary or
required by the circumstances of the case. Failing to obtain the
allowance, she is bound by the decree and is estopped from ask-
ing more in an independent action. It would indeed be severe
and harsh to expose the husband to actions by every one who
expended sums for the support of children over whom he exer-
cised no control. And the courts do not permit it.
The principle underlying this theory is said, by Mr. Bishop, to
be that the right to the services of the children and the obligations
to support them go together. The right and the duty are
reciprocal.
For discussion of this view see Harris v. Harris, 5 Kan. 46;
Hall v. Green, 87 Me. 122; Burrittv. Burritt, 29 Barb. 124; Brown
v. Smith, i9 R. I. 319; Fossv. Hartwel, 168 Mass. 66.
The later view considers the same facts but takes a different
attitude in the matter. The weakness of infant children, their
inability to secure for themselves food and clothing, shelter and
protection, arouses in every parent an affection for them which
of itself prompts the parent to do for them that which in their
helplessness they cannot do. The parents are of all persons the
most fit and proper to perform the trust reposed in them not only
by nature and custom but also by law. And although the per-
formance of this duty is imposed by law, its instrumentality is
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seldom invoked to enforce it. However, should dissensions arise
between the parents, the children not being parties thereto, will
not be deprived of their rights. It is not the policy of the law to
permit parents to evade their duties toward their children by the
wrongful neglect, failure or refusal to perform them. The pri-
mary liability for the support of the children rests on the father.
This is true at common law for the husband acquired his wife's
liabilities along with her property. By statutes, allowing the
wife a separate estate, the husband is generally declared to be
liable for the support of his infant children. The father is pri-
marily liable, the mother secondarily.
When the father shows by his own voluntary misconduct that
he is unfit to exercise parental control and the custody of the
children is awarded to the mother, he is not thereby released from
his pre-existing duty to support them unless the court so decrees.
The divorce from his wife is not a divorce from his children. His
liability for the support and education of his infant children
remains the same after divorce as it was before. Moreover, by
failing to carry out the trust imposed oil him, he forfeits the right
to the services of his children. Nor can he complain, since he
alone is responsible. The law will "not enable the father to con-
vert his own wrong into a shield against parental liability." It
is not the policy of the law to release the unworthy parent of a
burden and impose it as an additional one upon the worthy
parent.
By divorce, the husband and wife become, to all intents and
purposes, absolute strangers. They are then single persons and
none of the marital duties and obligations to each other survive
the decree. If a third person supports the infant children, he can
recover on the contract implied by law that the father will pay for
that for which he is primarily liable. And if a stranger can
recover in such cases, so may the wife who has become a stranger
by the divorce decree. Moreover, guardians, or other persons
having similar powers, are not personally liable for the expense of
maintaining their wards, whatever relationship they may be to
each other.
The fundamental principle upon which this argument is based,
as expressed by Bishop, is: "that no one can cast off an obliga-
tion by refusing to keep it, or any duty by an evil doing."
For discussion of this view see .Rankin v. Rankin, 83 Mo. App.
335; Pretzinger.v. Pretzinger, 45 0. St. 452; Stanton v. Willson, 3
Day, (Conn.) 37; Zilley v. Dunwiddie, 74 N. W. (Wis.) 126; Conn.
v. Conn., 57 Ind. 323.
CORPORATIONS-RIGHT TO CORPORATE NAME
The value of no kind of property has in recent years increased
more rapidly than the value of corporate names. A corporation
for a number of years turns, out a standard product or perhaps
spends enormous sums familiarizing consumers with illustrations
having its trade mark for a background and with verses of which
its name constitutes the refrain. Not infrequently the result is
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that the appellation which has thus become a household word is
of more value to such corporation than even its manufacturing
plant. As a consequence cases upon this subject have not only
increased in numbers but have grown greatly in importance.
One of the most interesting of this class of cases recently decided
is Blackwell's Durham Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco CO., 59 S. E.
(N. C.) 123.
Blackwell's Durham Tolacco Company of Durham sought to
restrain the American Tobacco Company and also Blackwell's
Tobacco Company, a New Jersey corporation, from using the
plaintiff's corporate name. In refusing the injunction the court
held that a domestic corporation does not acquire by the mere
adoption of a corporate name the exclusive right to use the same
and it does not acquire such a property right in the name as will
be protected by injunction.
These conclusions are based upon the theory that the only
right which a corporation has in its name results from the use of
such name. Thus in settling the rights to corporate names the
courts have reasoned from the analogous case of trade marks,
where of course use furnishes the only criterion of ownership.
Although few courts have had occasion to meet the question as
squarely as did the North Carolina court, yet many cases have
seemingly assumed that usage only is to be considered in deter-
mining the rights to a corporate name. And, if the analogous
rules in regard to trade marks are to be strictly followed, such
conclusions are entirely corre.ct. Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co.,
144 N. Y. 462; Lamb Knit Goods Co. v. Lamb Glove &- Mitten Co.,
120 Mich. z59.
Such a rule, however, is not altogether convenient even in the
case of trade marks. A man may have extensively advertised a
certain article by a distinctive name yet, leaving out of considera-
tion registry statutes, if some one else puts another article of the
same name upon the market before the advertised article is put
upon the market, he who has borne the expense of advertising
has no redress. Maxwell v. Hogg, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 307. Again
there is the ever recurring question: What is sufficient user? In
the case of trade marks, however, there are obvious reasons why
this rule in spite of its inconvenience should be adhered to. Since
at common law there is no formal adoption, definite adoption by
usage at least must be required; or as it has been stated, until an
originator puts his uniquely named article upon the market he
has given the world no consideration for the right to the exclu-
sive use of any name. Maxwell v. Hgogg, supra.
In the case of corporate names conferred at the time of incor-
poration this reasoning hardly holds. The assumption of the
corporated name at the time of incorporation is certainly adoption
definite enough to prevent any confusion. May it not also be
said that the assumption of corporated duties is sufficient con-
sideration for the right to such name?
This distinction between trade marks and corporate names
has not been altogether overlooked by the courts. Although
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usage is chiefly considered in determining the ownership of cor-
porate names, yet the time of incorporation has been recognized as
fixing some rights. Thus Tussaud v. Tussaud, 44 Ch. Div. 678,
decides that a corporation can not select a name which is the
same as or similar to that of another corporation created by, or
under the laws of, the same sovereignty, and in many states there
are statutes to the same effect. State v. .AfaGrath, 92 Mo. 355.
If usage were the sole criterion, would it not be logical in such
cases arising under the common law to hold that corporations
with the same name as one already in existence could be chartered
but that the name could not be used? Tending still further away
from the analogy to trade marks is American Order of Scottish Clans
v. Merrill, i5i Mass. 558, holding that when the name of a cor-
poration has been approved by the proper state officials at the
time of incorporation, such name becomes a part of the corporate
franchise. Rhode Island also holds that the name of a corpora-
tion is a part of its franchise, provided the corporation was
chartered by a special law. Paulino v. Beneficial Association, 18 R.
I. 165. One court, not of last resort, has assumed the logical con-
clusion of such reasoning which is that priority of incorporation
determines the right to a corporate name. German ffanoverian
Coach Horse Co. v. Oldenbery Coach Horse Association of America, 46
Ill. App 281.
It would seem in such a case as the present, where one of the
litigants is a foreign and the other a domestic corporation, that
the public policy of the state also would dictate that the domestic
corporation should as far as possible be protected. Some courts
consider this principle of public policy so potent that they hold
that a foreign corporation has no standing in a domestic court to
sue to restrain a domestic corporation from using the same name.
Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton Tripod Boiler Co., 142 Ill. 494. In
such a case as the one under discussion the same obligation of a
state to protect a corporation of its own creation might be urged
with perhaps more reason. If the court, however, feels itself
bound by the rigid rules of the law, perhaps the best way to
further the public policy of the state would be to pass a statute
prohibiting a foreign corporation from doing business in a state
under a name the same as or similar to one by which a domestic
corporation has been chartered and giving to the domestic cor-
poration the right to an injunction in accordance with the statute.
COURTS-ACTION AGAINST STATE
Last month in discussing So. -Ry. Co. v. Mf'Neil, 155 Fed. 756
(N. C.), and Seaboard Air line Ry. Co. v. R. Commission, 155 Fed.
792 (Ala.), we commented upon an important and far-reaching
question which now engages perhaps more of the attention and
anxious consideration of the public and of the courts of this
country than any other. Very recently the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, in State v. So. Ry. Co., 59 S. E. 570, has made a
decision upon practically the same state of facts as formed the
basis of the M'Neil decision, arriving at an opposite conclusion.
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The case arose upon the railway company's appeal from convic-
tion under the Passenger Rate Law of 1907. While arresting
judgment because no criminal offense was alleged in the indict-
ment, the court proceeded, with the utmost ingeniousness, be-
cause the arguments and briefs of counsel were largely devoted
to its consideration, to discuss the right of the federal court to
pass upon the rate question, and declare the suit in that court to
be one against the State within the prohibition of the Eleventh
Amendment.
The questions where and whether a suit is one against a state
within the Amendment are none too clearly settled. The lower
federal courts, wherever possible, have upheld their own juris-
diction. Virginia Coupon Cases, 25 Fed. 654; Parsons v. .Aarye, 23
Fed. x13; Gregg v. Sanford, 65 Fed. x5. In the Supreme Court,
since the early rule was departed- from, that a suit was one
against a state only when the state was a party upon the record.
Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, the decisions have been conflicting.
Clearly a suit by or against the governor of a state, as such, in
his official character, is a suit by or against a state. Xentucky v.
Dennison, 24 How. 16. A suit to compel a state auditor to pro-
ceed under an act authorizing him to levy a tax and to pay inter-
est on certain bonds is in effect a suit against the state. State v.
Steele, 134 U. S. 230. So where a suit is brought against state
officers to enforce the performance of a contract made by the
state, and the controversy is as to the validity and obligation of
the contract, and the only remedy sought is the enforcement of
the contract of the state, and the nominal defendants have no
personal interest in the subject matter, but depend only as repre-
sentatives of the state, the state is deemed the real party in
interest. Louisiana v. jrumel, 107 U. S. 711; Hagood v. Southern,
117 U. S. 52. But a suit against the railroad commission of a
state to restrain the enforcement of regulation as unjust and un-
reasonable-the state having no direct pecuniary interest therein
-is not within the prohibition. Reagan v. Farmer's Loan and
Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362. The result of the cases may be said to
be that (i) where the relief sought is affirmative official action by
state officers in the performance of an obligation which attached
to the state in its official capacity, the federal courts will not take
cognizance; but (2) where the relief sought is the performance
of a plain official duty requiring no exercise of discretion, or
where the state officers have invaded or threatened to invade the
vested pecuniary rights of the complainant in his property, the
suit is not within the Eleventh Amendment. Poindexter v. Green-
how, 114 U. S. 270; Pennoyer v. _cConnaughty, 140 U. S. x;
Reagan v. F. 6 L. Co., ura. The main difference between the
M'Neil and the principal cases appears to be this: the state court
holds that under the Passenger Rate Act there is nothing which
makes its operation depend at all upon anything to be done by the
Corporation Commission, or the Attorney General, or his assist-
ant, thus bringing the case within the first class, and within the
rules in .Fitts v. MrcGhee, 172 U. S. 5x6; whereas the federal court
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holds that the Commission is specially charged with important
duties in connection with the enforcement of the act in question
by the laws of North Carolina, and puts the case within the
second class.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-BRIDGES-LIABILITY TO REPAIR
The w y in which our courts will many times straddle an issue
is illustrated by the recent case of City of Flemingsburg- v. Fleming
County, 105 S. W. (Ky.) r33. The controversy was as to whether
the county or the city should bear the expense of rebuilding a
certain bridge in the most populous part of the city.
The burden of building and repairing the highways and
bridges of the state had been imposed by statute upon the various
municipal corporations. But as between county and city it was
not clear from the wording of the statute upon which corporation
fell the burden of rebuilding a bridge within the boundaries of
both. There was an express provision that the county must
repair public bridges within the county and forming part of the
county highways. But the duty to control and care for the
"streets and public places" within the boundaries of the city was
cast upon the city. The county contended that the bridge was a
part of the city's "streets and public places" and hence should be
taken care of by the city. On the other hand the city contended
that though the bridge was in one sense a part of its streets yet
that the legislature used the term "streets and public places" in
a limited sense and plainly its intention was to exclude bridges
from that term. This legislative intent the city deduced from the
fact that the legislature imposed the duty upon cities of the first,
second, third and fourth classes to construct and repair "streets
and bridges" whereas among the duties imposed upon cities of
the fifth class, to which class Flemingsburg, belong-ed, and towns
of the sixth class the word "bridge" is not mentioned. It was
maintained that the legislature intentionally omitted the word
"bridge" from the list of duties put upon cities of the fifth class
and towns of the sixth class because they were the smallest and
could not be expected to stand the expense of maintaining large
bridges which happened to be within their boundaries, particularly
as the benefits would accrue more to the welfare of the county than
to that of the city. But the county claimed that the bridge was
in the center of the city, that most of the traffic over it was local
in its character, that it was part of the city's "streets and public
places" and that therefore the city should bear the expense.
The court in handling the troublesome question before it
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seems to have put stress upon the consideration, for whose bene-
fit the bridge would be, rather than upon the consideration, upon
whom, the legislature had cast the burden. It came to the con-
clusion that each corporation must pay a part of the expense,
proportionate to the benefit it would derive from the bridge, as
measured by the character of the travel over it. No doubt such
a conclusion was a just one according to political science reason-
ing. The situation called for some remedy but was that remedy
a judicial one? Did not the court invade the realm of the legisla-
ture? The legislature had committed this thing to the care of the
county and that to the care of the city and so on through
the matters pertaining to local ,government; but however
ambiguous it may have been in pointing out these individual
duties, surely it seems that the intention of the legislature was to
impose all of these enumerated duties upon either one or the
other of these public corporations. The court found that the
legislation was insufficient and did not do complete justice. In
trying to remedy the evil the court held that it must have been
the intention of the legislature that these corporations share the
burden because such would be highly equitable. But no matter
how equitable or just a provision might have been had it been
inserted, such a fact does not make it a part of the intention of
the legislature.
The court had previously been confronted with the same
troublesome facts in the case of Leslie County v. Wooten, 25 Ky. Law
Rep. 217, except that the bridge in that case was in the outskirts
of the city. The court there decided that the legislature did not
intend that the phrase "streets and public places" should include
bridges on country roads used mostly for county travel even
though within the boundaries of the city. Such construction is
common in this country. Union Drainage Dist. v. Highway Com-
missioners, 87 Ill. App. 93. But when the court decided in the case
under consideration that the county and city must share the
expense, it seems not only to have gone too far in construing the
intention of the legislature, but also to have added to the confu-
sion in the law on the subject in Kentucky. In Town of Paints-
ville v. Commonwealtht, 21 Ky. Law Rep. x634, the court had held
that the town could be indicted for failure to keep in repair a
bridge within its boundaries even though the bridge had been built
and previously repaired by the county. That decision seems in
conflict with the spirit of the legislative intent as interpreted by
the court in Leslie County v. Wooten, supra, and in the case under
consideration.
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Furthermore, even though the chancellor should have no diffi-
culty in determining the proportion of county as distinguished
from city travel, who would have control of the bridge? Control
of repairs should rest with the body liable to make them. White-
hall v. Freeholders of Gloucester, 40 N. J. Law 305. Would it be
practical for the country to have, say, thirty-seven one hun-
dredths of the control ?
Thus the confusion has been increased even though the court
in reaching its conclusion administered a remedy which would
more properly have come from the legislature. Such interpreta-
tion of statutes from the outside as we might say illustrates well
the truth of the words of that eminent jurist, Judge Coleridge, in
Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 269, where he said, "It is wiser to ascer-
tain the powers of the instrument with which you work, and
employ it only on subjects to which they are equal and suited;
and if you go beyond this you strain and weaken it, and attain
but imperfect and unsatisfactory, and often only unjust results."
